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ABSTRACT 
  
This study assesses the impact of a change in tax system in South Africa and the effects caused 
thereof on both the government and mining companies .This is done by comparing different 
tax models and analyzing the results to determine their suitability to be used in South Africa. 
A hypothetical case study is used to achieve the goals of the study by employing six different 
case scenarios under different threshold rates, tax rates and corporate income tax rates on a 
mining project. An NPV generated from a discounted cash flow under each scenario is used to 
evaluate the project success, the tax revenue generated shows how much government stands 
to make. The results show that the project NPV is highest when both the corporate income 
tax rate and the resource rent tax rate are reduced. The study also reveals reducing the tax 
rate has a greater effect on changing project NPV and potential government revenue than 
reducing the threshold rate and/or the corporate income tax rate. An assessment on the 
readiness of South Africa to changing tax systems shows that although the resource rent tax 
system can generate high revenues for government, the disadvantages of changing tax 
systems on the country as a whole currently outweigh the advantages.    
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CIT Corporate Income Tax   
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
MPRDA Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
MRRT Mineral Resource Rent Tax 
NPV Net Present Value 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background  
The discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfields in the 1880’s led to major industrialization in 
South Africa. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was formed a year after the discovery of 
gold, with the purpose of seeking funding for the mining industry. Mining would become 
one of the industries in the forefront of the South African economy (Curtis 2009).   
Gold mining has since decreased in production (StatisticsSA 2015), however South Africa is 
still the leading producer of other minerals such as Platinum Group metals, chromium and 
manganese (Curtis 2009). Despite the recent challenges of labor unrest, low commodity 
prices and weaker demand, the industry continues to be a major contributor to the 
country’s economy. The contribution of the industry towards the GDP was 8.3 percent in 
2013 and a report from the Chamber of Mines of South Africa (2013) showed that the 
mining industry is still making noticeable contributions in the economy. This is through 
contributions to export revenue, investment (private sector investment and overall total 
investment), tax revenue and employment. The Chamber of Mines (2013) showed that 
mining has contributed R2.4 trillion to export earnings and to the GDP over the past decade, 
in 2013 the industry contributed 12.2 percent towards total investment in the economy 
(ChamberofMinesofSouthAfrica 2013).   
The mining industry is one of the biggest contributors to South Africa’s tax revenue. Mining 
houses are taxed slightly differently from other sectors. Mining companies pay corporate 
income taxes and mining royalties that are specific to the mining industry. The introduction 
of the Mineral and Petroleum Royalty Development Act (MPRDA) brought an increase to 
the total contribution of taxes to the economy. Between 2009 and 2011 taxes increased 
from 10 billion to R25.7 billion following the introduction of the royalties act and by 2013 
this amount had increased to approximately R27 billion (Cawood and Oshokoya (2013). 
The industry’s contribution to the tax revenue is however affected by a number of factors 
such as commodity prices (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010).  
 
Governments tax mining companies because not only are mineral resources nonrenewable 
but also because the state should benefit from the exploitation of their country’s 
resources. According to South Africa’s Freedom Charter and the MPRDA, the mineral 
wealth shall be owned by the people. The MPRDA (2012) stipulates that the state is the 
custodian of the country’s minerals. However over the years there have been concerns 
that government is not taxing mining companies enough and with the backing of the 
Freedom Charter and the MPRDA a debate of resource nationalism began in 2010(Cawood 
and Oshokoya 2013).   
8  
  
The risks associated with mining are quite significant and therefore the potential return 
should be commensurately high (Ball and Bowers 1984). Mineral resources are exhaustible 
and the period of mining a resource is not always guaranteed. Social costs associated with 
environmental damage done through the mining process itself are also a significant risk. 
Commodity prices which play an important role in determining revenue pose a risk since they 
are fluctuate considerably. However when times are good and commodity prices boom, 
mining houses stand to make large amounts of revenue (Otto 2006). It is in this time that 
governments may want to change their tax systems (Land 2008).   
In March 2012 the ruling party released a State Intervention in the Mineral Sector (SIMS) 
report, a document that addressed the shortfalls of the current taxation instruments used 
for South Africa’s mining industry. The country currently collects revenue through royalties 
and corporate income tax (ANC 2012).  
The report sought to develop ways that could be used to obtain optimal results in terms of 
growth, development and employment created from the exploitation of the country’s 
assets. One of the proposals made in the report on ownership and control of the nation’s 
mineral assets, was for the country to adopt resource rent tax as an instrument used in the 
mining industry. The report discourages nationalization of mines pointing out that the 
government would not be able to afford going into either complete nationalization or 51 
percent ownership of mines, as the former could cost the government over 1 trillion (ANC  
2012).   
          
1.2. Research Problem  
Mining companies contribute significantly to the South African economy however the 
South African government feels that the mines can make a greater contribution to the 
economy if mining taxes are increased (ANC 2012).  Although the government seeks to 
implement this system, there has been very little study done on the effects to mining 
companies on the proposed resource tax regime changes (Laporte and de Quatrebarbes 
2015)  
This study aims to look into the impact that will be caused by introducing a new tax system 
in the industry and how the rest of the economy will be affected. Will it be of benefit as 
the government suggests or will it dent companies and chase away investors? This study 
will be helpful to government, investors and the general public.  
  
1.3. Research Objectives  
Objectives of the study are:  
• To create an optimum MRRT model to be used by the South African government. 
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• To ensure a fair share of rent is collected without chasing investors out of the mining 
industry and/or the country.  
• To assess the financial impact that will be incurred if the new MRRT regime is implemented 
on South African mining companies.  
  
1.4 Significance of the Study  
The concept of resource taxation can prove to be complex to understand and to practice 
in the resource industry. Some even believe that changing South Africa’s current tax 
regime is a hasty decision that is not only unnecessary but also unfair to investors who 
have to bear the risk of investing in an uncertain asset (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013).  With 
studies having been done on MRRT as a form of revenue collection, not much focus has 
been placed on the impact that the introduction of this regime will have on financial 
performance of companies. The success of MRRT is based on the ability of government to 
generate revenue. Studies have shown that the revenue that government stands to make 
from using resource rents, without taking into account the effects of deterring 
investments, will be more than the revenue that is currently being collected from royalties 
(ANC,2012).  In South Africa however there hasn’t been much empirical evidence to prove 
this (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013). While there is a lot that government will have to take 
into consideration before it even begins to start implementing this proposed regime, 
finding a model that will suit South Africa’s industry is important. Government should also 
take into consideration that there are different qualities in resources and in a given 
economic environment the performance of the mines will also be different (Otto 2006).  
This study will be significant because it will focus on the impact that this proposed MRRT 
will have on the financial performance of mining companies. Although it is obvious that 
companies’ profits will be impacted, it is not obvious how the amount can be estimated. 
This study will also focus on creating a potential model that can be used by government to 
avoid chasing away current and future investors. Government will find this useful since 
they want to offer a suitable tax environment that will attract investors into the country. 
Investors will find this information useful as they can then decide when and if the new 
regime is implemented, whether to continue with their investment or seek other 
opportunities.  
 
1.5 Research Problem  
Resource companies in South Africa pay corporate income tax and as of 2010 royalties are 
also payable by the industry.  According to Cawood (2012) the contribution made by 
mining companies to the economy is already more than other companies contribute and 
the current royalties system used has improved tax revenue for government. This would 
explain why the mining industry is believed to be one of the bigger contributors to 
economic development (Curtis 2009).  
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Despite beliefs that the current system used is effective, the South African government still 
believes that the state is being robbed of its share on the mineral wealth of the country 
(SIMS 2012). Some governments opt for renegotiation of tax regimes when they realize 
they are losing out on profits made by mining companies (Land 2008). However investors 
may not take well to a change in tax regime (Sarker and Whalan 2011).  
 Mining is a risky investment and investors believe that they need adequate compensation 
for taking on the investment and not investing in something else less riskier. A certain level 
of uncertainty develops within investors when governments decide to demand bigger 
shares of rents from mining companies by changing tax regimes to favor them as host 
countries (Palmer 1980). Some investors may even decide to stop investing in that country 
(Land 2008) .The introduction of a MRRT would be over and above the current tax regimes 
that South Africa is using (ANC 2012). Although studies have been made to assess the 
effectiveness of the current tax regimes in collecting rents, the public is still misinformed 
about the difference between revenue collection and revenue management by the 
government and believes that more rent needs to be collected (Cawood and Oshokoya 
2013).   
Currently South Africa does not have a model that will be used for the proposed resource 
rent tax. This model must be developed in a way that it will capture a ‘fair’ share of rents 
but will not discourage investment in the country, new or old. Without a model the 
potential revenue that can be collected is not known for sure, and therefore the success 
of this MRRT is questionable.  A model for an optimum tax regime would enable calculation 
of the impact that this new regime would make on mining companies and their 
performance financially.   
In this study an attempt will be made to find the optimum MRRT model that will suit the South 
African mining industry and its investors, thereby allowing the assessment of the financial 
impact that investors will be subjected to under this new regime. Results of this assessment 
can be used by the government, investors and the public. Governments will be able to see who 
is benefitting more.   
 
1.6. Outline of the Report  
Having introduced the topic, Chapter 2 will cover the literature behind the concept of 
Resource Rent taxes, the background and comments that have been said about this 
proposed tax model. It is essential to look into the success of MRRT in other countries. In 
Chapter 3 the research methodology and approach to solving the research problem will be 
discussed. This will include the data and its sources. The results of the study will be given 
and analyzed in Chapter 4, including the finding of the study. Chapter 5 covers the findings 
of the study. A conclusion on the study will be made in Chapter 6 and recommendations 
will be made in this chapter.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1. Introduction  
Taxation is a way for governments to obtain revenue from the different sectors within the 
economy. This revenue is eventually used to develop the country’s infrastructure and for the 
needs of the public in general (Nakhle 2008). South Africa is a resource endowed developing 
country and even though the economy’s dependence on resources is decreasing compared 
to other industries, it is still considered as a resource dependent country. Efficient ways of 
revenue collection are important (Barma, Kaiser et al. 2012). This study will focus on the 
background behind mineral taxation in particular and resource rent taxation theories and 
models that have been in use in other countries. The study will also look at theories that 
have been presented by scholars on mineral taxation.  
This chapter is structured as follows: a discussion on the general history of mineral taxation 
in section 2.2 followed by a greater focus into resource rent tax in section 2.3 with specific 
focus on theories that have been presented. Resource rent tax models that have been in 
use thus far will be discussed in section 2.4 and examples of countries that have used this 
tax system will be in section 2.5. Section 2.6 will discuss the current regimes used in South 
Africa before finally concluding the review in the last section of the chapter, section 2.7.  
 
2.2. History of Mineral Taxation  
Governments tax corporates as well as individuals, and the revenue collected is then used 
to build a better economy for the nation. Mining is a very risky industry to invest in, 
however with risk comes return. Mineral rich countries usually open their doors to 
investors who can bear the risk embedded in mining, while the government puts policies 
in place to also reap the rewards from the exploitation of these minerals (Palmer 1980) 
(Cawood and Oshokoya 2013). There are a number of benefits to resource extraction, the 
biggest and most important benefit is the revenue collected from mining taxes (Daniel, 
Keen et al. 2010).  
The resource industry is often not taxed in the same manner as other industries this is 
because of the unique features of mining businesses. One of the unique features of mining 
that affects tax and government revenues is that it is a cyclical industry, the volatility of 
commodity prices makes revenues to sometimes be very high and at others very low. The 
periods when commodity prices are very high are called ‘commodity booms’ and it is in this 
time that government can make more revenue if their fiscal tax regime is properly designed 
to take advantage of these booms. Table 1 below shows the unique characteristics of the 
mining industry and the tax policy adjustments that governments make especially for this 
industry (Otto 2004) (Otto 2006).   
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The taxation of mineral resources is done differently because of the industry’s 
characteristics that differ from those of other industries. Governments that are in mineral 
rich countries use taxation as way to give the nation what is rightfully theirs. These 
governments use tax policies that bring the highest portion of mining profits back to the 
state. The uniqueness of the mining industry gives government reason to create tax 
policies that are only applicable to the industry. If the tax incentives are too advantageous 
to mining  or too discriminative against other industries, investors may disinvest in non-
mining sectors  in favor of the preferential  treatment of mining (Otto 2004).   
Table 1: Tax policy adjustments unique to the mineral resource industry (Otto 2006) 
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Most mineral rich developing countries may offer tax incentives to private companies in 
order to attract investors however the fiscal regimes must not be too relaxed such that the 
state is not able to get the maximum benefit of the mineral wealth (Cawood and Oshokoya 
2013). There has been a growing concern mostly in developing countries that governments 
have not been taxing private companies responsible for the exploitation of the country’s 
minerals enough as compared to the super profits that they are making. Governments seek 
to create a good relationship with the investors.   
The state believes that they should get a fair share of the mineral wealth created as they 
own the resources being exploited.  The debate about resource nationalism was started 
with reference to the above concerns. Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) show in their 
definition of resource nationalism that citizens of a resource rich country require some 
sort of benefit and can make a claim on the resource assets in that country.  
Governments are faced with the task of making sure that the policies that are put in place 
are fair to both the investor and the state. Keeping in mind that the goal of the government 
is to secure a greater share of the wealth created from mining, the policies implemented 
to do this must not be too hard on the investor causing disinvestment in the country. 
Investors believe that for the great risk they are taking in mining they must be greatly 
rewarded in return, taking a high portion of the profits they make can lead to decreased 
investment and poor exploitation of the mineral resources. Most mineral rich developing 
countries need good tax policies to attract investors and encourage more mineral 
exploration by private companies (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013).  
The concept of mineral taxation and rent dates back to the 19th century when David 
Ricardo explained the concept of land tax. According to Ricardo rent should be paid for 
land with the highest quality as compared to other pieces of land. The difference in the 
quality between two pieces of land determine the amount of rent due. The more fertile 
the land, the more produce will be made from that land, leading to the farmer making 
more profit than his counterparts. However only when there is production from land with 
a lower rank of quality can the farmer from the most fertile land start paying rent (Ricardo 
1891).  This kind of rent would later be referred to as Ricardian rent (Otto 2006). In this 
context rent can be defined as the money given to the land owner by a farmer who makes 
a greater profit compared to other farmers because of the advantage of farming in a more 
fertile land and therefore getting produce easier than the other farmers.  
He explained it further by showing that the lesser fertile land will require more labor to 
cultivate and make the same amount of produce as compared to the most fertile land. The 
farmer of the most fertile land must then pay for the ease of production as compared to 
other farmers.   
Although David Ricardo was discussing rent based on fertility of agricultural land, 
similarities of agricultural land and mineral deposits can be drawn since minerals are not 
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deposited the same across the land. Some mines have high grade deposits while others 
have low grade deposits, and most ore bodies are not of the same size, which therefore 
means that the level of production cannot be the same (Otto 2006).   
 
Payment to governments for mineral extraction goes as far back as pre-world war II.  Garnaut 
and Ross (1975) built on the foundation laid by David Ricardo by taking the discussion further 
than just land tax and focusing on the resource industry and how governments can get as 
great a share as possible from the profits made without compromising the level of investment 
in the country (Garnaut and Ross 1975). These two authors argued that in order for 
government to get more of the mineral wealth a ‘Resource Rent Tax (RRT)’ would need to be 
imposed on the investor. While the process of determining an optimal level of taxation or a 
mix of taxes cannot be easy (Otto 2006), resource rent tax would be found to be one of the 
best ways that governments can use to capture as much profit as possible (Land 2008).    
 
Resource rent tax was developed during the 1970s when the mining industry was performing 
exceptionally well due to rising commodity prices. The fiscal tax regime was developed to 
capture profits termed as ‘rent’ in a gold-copper mine in Papua New Guinea.  
The United Kingdom then followed on these footsteps and imposed a Petroleum Revenue 
Tax on the country’s oil industry. Garnaut and Ross were regarded as one of the first authors 
to publish work and shed some light into the concept of resource rent taxation (Land 2008).   
Resource rent is the surplus return on a project investment that is earned after all 
deductions have been made from the total revenue of a project. Any amount received in 
excess of what the investor was expecting is regarded as rent, returns above the minimum 
expected return of a project (Garnaut and Ross 1975). Resource rent can also be referred 
to as economic rent, however these two are not exactly the same. Economic rent is the 
return that is earned not only from mineral exploitation but also from other factors such 
as skills from the manager that could earn the investor more return (Daniel, Keen et al. 
2010). Other definitions of economic rent include the definition given by Hogan and 
Goldsworthy (2010), “The economic rent in an economic activity is the excess profit or 
supernormal profit, and is equal to revenue less costs where costs include normal profit or 
a “normal” rate of return to capital”. Other authors explained economic rent differently 
by defining it as ‘the product sale price less the costs of production, transportation and 
distribution, including a minimum return on capital employed, over the full cycle (i.e. 
lifetime) of a project’ (Kellas 2010). Resource rent tax cannot influence the decision of an 
investor to invest in a project, because rent is over and above the expected return (Otto 
2006).    
Although this study is focused on resource rent tax, mineral taxation is a broad topic and 
includes other forms of taxation.  
15  
  
Mineral taxation can be classified into a number of fiscal instruments, which can also be 
further broken down into different kinds of taxes. These fiscal instruments are explained in 
table 2 below (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010).  
    
Table 2: Different Fiscal instruments used by governments 
Rent based taxes  
  
• Brown tax – named after Brown, this is levied as a constant percentage of the 
annual net cash flow (the difference between total revenue and total costs) of a resource 
project with cash payments made to private investors in years of negative net cash flow. 
The Brown tax is a useful benchmark against which to assess other policy options, but is 
not considered to be a feasible policy option for implementation since it involves cash 
rebates to private investors (Brown 1948).  
• Resource rent tax – rather than providing a cash rebate, negative net cash flows 
are accumulated at a threshold rate and offset against future profit. When this balance 
turns positive it becomes taxable at the rate of the resource rent tax. The resource rent 
tax was first proposed by Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1975) for natural resource projects 
in developing countries to enable more of the net economic benefits of these projects to 
accrue to the domestic economy.  
• Excess profits tax – the government collects a percentage of a project’s net cash 
flow when the investment payback ratio (the “R-factor”) exceeds one. The R-factor is the 
ratio of cumulative receipts over cumulative costs (including the upfront investment). This 
method differs from the resource rent tax in that it does not take explicit account of the 
time value of money or the required return of the investor. No excess profits tax in the R 
factor form has been applied to the mining sector.  
  
Profit-based taxes and royalties  
  
• Corporate income tax – typically an important part of the fiscal regime for all 
countries; a higher tax rate may be applied to mineral companies within the standard 
corporate income tax regime, and it may be designed to vary with taxable income (e.g. 
Botswana).  
• Profit-based royalty – the government collects a percentage of a project’s profit; 
typically based on some measure of accounting profit. This differs from the standard 
income tax in that it is levied on a given project rather than the corporation.  
  
output-based royalties  
  
• Ad valorem royalty – the government collects a percentage of a project’s value of 
production.  
• Graduated price-based windfall tax – the government collects a percentage of a 
project’s value of production with the tax rate on a sliding scale based on price (that is, a 
higher tax rate is triggered by a higher commodity price).  
• Specific royalty – the government collects a charge per physical unit of production.  
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State equity  
  
• Paid equity – the government becomes a joint venture partner in the project. Paid 
equity on commercial terms is analogous to a Brown tax where the tax rate is equal to the 
share of equity participation.  
• Carried interest – the government acquires its equity share in the project from the 
production proceeds including an interest charge. Carried interest is analogous to a 
resource rent tax where the tax rate is equal to the equity share and the threshold rate 
of return is equal to the interest rate on the carry.  
 
2.3. Resource Rent Tax Theories   
Garnaut and Clunies (1975) defined Resource rent as ‘A profit tax that begins to be 
collected when a certain threshold internal rate of return on total cash flow has been 
realized’, this means that the system only starts taxing once the investor’s minimum rate 
of return has been reached. An MRRT system taxes the economic rents or what is known 
as above normal profit as explained above in section 2.1.The ability of the system to tax 
economic rent has made the system very attractive to governments, although the factors 
of the system have been found to be complex to determine, theoretically the potential to 
raise high revenues is why it is preferred over other tax systems. Figure 1 below shows 
how the total value of a project over its lifetime can be explained. MRRT only focuses on 
the ‘rent’ remaining once the costs and the rate of return have been deducted (Land 2008).  
Figure 1: Resource Rent Tax explained 
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When taxing the economic rent of a project there is no influence by the tax system on the 
investor’s decision making process, this is known as neutrality and is explained in more detail 
in section 2.3.1 below. MRRT is also very attractive because its ability to raise revenue 
increases as the economic rents of a project increase.   
The government’s objectives when setting up a fiscal policy are to create a policy that will 
be economically efficient in bringing in maximum revenue but not chasing investors away 
from investing in the country (Ball and Bowers 1984).   
There is a criteria that governments use to assess the efficiency of a tax system. This study 
will look into the criteria used and later use this to determine whether or not resource rent 
tax meets the government’s objectives.  
 
2.3.1. Neutrality  
A tax system that does not affect investment decisions of an investor is said to be neutral. 
This kind of tax system will not help an investor decide if the project is profitable or not and 
thus if he should or should not invest, it does not affect the performance of the mine in 
terms of production or anything related to the stages of mining. A neutral tax system should 
also not affect or influence the exploitation speed of resources.   
Rent and profit based taxes are regarded as more neutral than other types of taxes, as 
revenue collection is based on the profitability of the project, they are therefore considered 
at the end once production has taken place (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010).  
A tax system that is non-neutral can cause distortions in the decision making process of an 
investor about a project. Usually unit based taxes can have the effect of influencing the 
process of mining by causing over exploitation of resources and having higher cut-off 
grades that will create more profit even after tax. This reduces the size of economic 
reserves and therefore shortens the life of mine (Guj 2012).  
Although Garnaut and Clunies, other authors and scholars believe that RRT is neutral, 
Smith (1999) showed that once a firm decided to do more exploration thereby delaying 
production and the time of investment, the tax credits obtained become a reason for the 
firm to change investment decisions. RRT is only neutral when there are no opportunities 
to do further exploration and to deter exploitation, however once the RRT parameters are 
known the investor can decide to change his investment timing or the rate of production, 
thus making MRRT non neutral (Smith 1999).  
On their paper ‘The Resource Rent Tax: A Penalty on Risk Taking’, Ball and Bowers (1984) 
showed that RRT was not as economically efficient as Garnaut and Clunies (1975) had shown 
on their paper.  
Ball and Bowers argued that RRT was simply a penalty on successful risk taking done by an 
investor, the authors used a hypothetical case of an investment proposal to show that RRT 
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can cause a viable project to be rejected, and thus causing the claims that RRT is neutral to 
be untrue. 
Ball and Bowers (1984) further used the concept of a call option and the Black-Scholes model 
to show that with an increased RRT payment, there is an increased risk on the side of the 
investor.  
  
2.3.2. Ability to collect revenue  
The higher the level of taxation the more revenue governments collect, however only until 
a certain point. Increasing the level of taxation can deter investment flow. The more 
wealth government receives, the less companies receive, with the number one goal of an 
investor being to make as much profit as possible, if this keeps decreasing then the 
investor has very little reason to keep his investments in the country (Otto 2006).   
The ability of a tax system to collect revenue is important since rent collection is one of 
the major reasons why government tax the mineral resource industry. Government should 
design a tax system that is able to satisfy the needs of the state, it should not be too soft 
such that governments end up losing the potential revenue because of under taxing 
(Cawood and Oshokoya 2013).  
The maximum marginal tax rate affects the ability to raise revenue, and therefore the 
optimum level of taxation should be carefully determined. There is also great importance 
in how the government uses the revenue collected. This is a well-studied topic in literature 
and scholars have showed that governments can use revenues in such a manner that will 
not lead to the public thinking that the mining industry is being under taxed.  
 
2.3.3. Adaptability  
The flexibility of a tax system during different circumstances in the economy is significant 
in determining an efficient tax system. An adaptable system will also be applicable across 
a range of projects and commodities. Such a system will also affect the revenue raising 
capability because an adaptable system will also be progressive. Progressiveness means 
that the more profit a project makes, the more the tax system will extract revenue. A 
system that is not progressive is regressive, and not economically efficient. This can be 
used to indicate the adaptability of a tax system (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010).  
Adaptability increases the stability of a tax system and thus reduces the rate of return of 
the investor because the risk is reduced (Garnaut 2010), the relationship between risk and 
return is discussed more in section 2.3.4.    
19  
  
2.3.4. Investor perception of risk  
The higher the risk, the greater the reward, this is how investment works. The more the 
risk the more the investor will require a minimum rate of return for the risk he is taking by 
investing in a project.  
The risk is usually country risk and relates to the political risk and the stability of a tax 
system. The stability of a tax system is assessed by studying previous investments and the 
reaction of government in times of commodity booms or great profits, the ability of 
government to change existing tax systems to new systems that favor government and 
can bring in more revenue (Garnaut and Clunies 1975) .Should the investor believe for any 
reason that government can change the fiscal policy then he has reason to increase the 
rate of return. A high rate of return reduces the revenue collected by government 
(Garnaut 2010).   
A conclusion can be made from the study of government objectives that RRT is 
economically efficient. The RRT system is neutral, progressive and has the potential to 
raise high revenues for government.   
When using a progressive and adaptable tax system there is very little reason for government 
to change an existing system in a different time in the economy or to renegotiate fiscal terms. 
As discussed above this reduces the investor’s perception of risk and therefore his minimum 
rate of return. A reduction on the investor’s rate of return leaves more revenue available for 
government to collect (Land 2008).   
 
Although RRT has not been used in practice in many countries, most countries use a mix 
of taxes to achieve their objectives. Scholars have attempted to show how pure RRT can 
be used as a tax system, but there has been very little research done on how this system 
can be purely used in countries like South Africa that have decreasing level of resource 
endowments. Table 3 shows the countries that have used the RRT system, the sector and 
the period when the system was employed (Daniel, Keen et al. 
2010). The RRT system has been mostly employed in the petroleum industry. According to 
Land (2008) past experience has shown that using a pure RRT imposes risk on government. 
With the high level of uncertainty in the mining industry, there is a risk placed on the 
potential for government to receive revenue.  
Table 3: Countries that have used RRT in the petroleum and mining sectors (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010) 
COUNTRY   SECTOR  YEARS IN FORCE  
Papa New Guinea  Petroleum  Since 1977  
  Mining  From 1978-2002  
Australia  Petroleum  Since 1984  
  Mining (Iron ore and Coal)  2012  
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Tanzania  Petroleum  Since 1984  
Various  Petroleum  Mid 1980s   
Madagascar  Petroleum  1980s   
  Mining  1980s  
Ghana  Mining   From 1985-2003  
  Petroleum  Since 1984  
Canada, British Colombia   Mining  Since 1990  
Zimbabwe  Mining  Since 1994  
Namibia  Petroleum  Since 1993  
Russia  Petroleum  Since 1994  
Angola  Petroleum  Since mid-1990s  
Azerbaijan  Petroleum  Since 1996  
Kazakhstan  Petroleum  Since mid-1990s  
Solomon Islands  Mining(Gold)  Since 1999  
Timor-Leste  Petroleum  Since 2003  
Malawi  Mining   Since 2006  
Liberia  Mining  Since 2008  
  
Although the higher end of the spectrum shows that most authors prefer RRT, some simply 
believe that the system is too complex and can only lead to confusion. With very little 
evidence from practical applications, scholars are leaning more towards existing systems 
already tested than the use of RRT (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013).   
The RRT design is too complex and difficult and this is believed to be one of the reasons that 
have caused it to fail in countries that have employed this system (Sunley and Baunsgaard 
2001). The design of the RRT will be discussed below.  
 
2.4. Resource Rent tax Model  
The design of a fiscal system is one area that has been focused on by most researchers 
because it determines the success or failure of the whole tax system. Resource rent tax 
has been criticized for being too complex to use in other countries (Boadway and Flatters 
1993).  
 A lot of questions have been asked regarding how the tax system should be designed in 
order to bring in maximum revenue for government and secure future investments. Some 
authors have studied how effective an efficient RRT system should perform, and one of 
the features is that it should tax full rents (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010).The way in which RRT 
works is that it only taxes positive cash flows and allows for all costs including capital costs 
to be deducted from the revenue. 
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 In the case of a negative cash flow, the cash flow is carried forward into the next year at 
an interest rate calculated based on the internal rate of return of the investor (Garnaut 
2010).  In this section the focus will be on how best to design an RRT system, based on 
previous research and on countries that have employed the system in their countries.   
The two main features of a resource rent tax model are:  
• The threshold rate – This is the rate at which the RRT is triggered, and it should be 
higher or equal to the investor’s rate of return. Governments have the choice to 
use different techniques to determine the threshold rate. A cost of capital can be 
obtained from the capital markets where a certain risk premium is then added to 
the cost of capital to determine the required rate of return of the investor. This 
requires government to have sufficient market information. Determining the risk 
premium can be very hard but once determined, the government can then set a 
fixed threshold rate. However there is also the option of using the risk free rate of 
return obtained from government bonds and then adding a fixed rate over and 
above this risk free rate (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010). In this option the risk free rate 
changes annually but the threshold rate added to this is fixed. There are also other 
options that government can choose to determine the threshold rate, such as 
negotiation with investors, however this can lead to different rates that are specific 
to a particular type of project. Usually the threshold rate is across the industry and 
not a project to project rate (Land 2008). The higher the threshold rate the more a 
RRT system becomes neutral, because this increases the after tax profits to the 
investor and decreases the potential government revenue (Smith 1999).  
  
• The tax rate- This is the rate at which profits are taxed once the threshold rate has 
been reached. Government cannot tax the excess profits at 100 percent because 
this will cause disinvestment and also discourage any future exploration in the 
country even though it would be getting maximum revenue. This is where the 
balance needs to be exercised to satisfy both the investor and government. A high 
tax rate can bring in maximum revenue for government however it can cause many 
distortions to the RRT. Tax rates can be determined through negotiations with 
investors (Land 2008). If the tax rate is too high the whole tax system could have 
distorting effects in the nature of reducing future exploration, new investments 
and can possibly cause other mines to close down (Garnaut 2010). A system with a 
high tax rate is stable but has many distorting effects on investment decisions.   
  
2.5. Resource Rent Tax Success Rate  
There are very few practical examples of RRT being used as an individual tax system across 
the minerals industry, most countries use hybrid tax system or a combination of tax system 
to avoid fiscal risk. In this section the paper focuses on countries that have used the RRT 
even though it has been used with other tax system.   
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2.5.1. Australia  
Australia is one of the top mining countries in the world, being one of the largest producers 
of gold, iron ore, aluminum, uranium and brown coal (Guj 2012). The resource industry in 
Australia is a considerable contributor to the GDP, contributing approximately 9 percent 
to the total output between 2010 and 2011,although this was down from the 11.5 percent 
contributed in between 2007 and 2008 (Hogan and McCallum 2010). In 2011 the mineral 
exports accounted for more than half of the total exports in the country. The industry is 
also a major contributor to tax revenue in the country and this is why the tax systems used 
are important to ensure government gets a fair share of the resource wealth (Hogan and 
McCallum 2010).  
The concept of Resource Rent Tax was introduced in Australia in the early 1980s’ in the 
petroleum industry and became the basis of most research that was done about RRT, the 
tax system has since been modified to suit the objectives of the government and the 
investor (Hogan and Goldsworthy 2010). This study will not focus on the petroleum 
resource rent tax (PRRT) but rather on the recently proposed mineral resource rent tax 
(MRRT).   
The mineral resources in Australia like other countries belong to the state (Garnaut 2010), 
and it is therefore the objective of the government to maximize the revenue collected 
while attracting private investors (Hogan and McCallum 2010). The topic of RRT was 
recently revisited as Australia sought to change its tax system to capture more rents like 
most other countries have been trying to do recently. Although changing of fiscal regimes 
to capture more rents is a sign of instability, investors have a choice of engaging in 
renegotiations with government or taking their business elsewhere (Land 2008).  
In 2012 the Australian government introduced a new fiscal regime for the iron ore and coal 
industry. This tax system would be known as the MRRT and would be a tax on economic 
rent. The MRRT was actually a modified version of a previously proposed tax system, the 
Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT). 
 
 The MRRT was designed as follows:  
• Tax rate – A tax rate of 22.5 percent was imposed. There is a headline rate of 30 percent 
and a 25 percent extraction allowance against MRRT liability.  
• Threshold rate- A threshold amount of $75 million per annum was applicable. 
Companies making a profit below $75 million where not liable to pay MRRT.  
• Tax base – The basis of the tax was mining profit before deductions of interest expenses.  
Although this new tax system was not widely accepted in the industry, the estimation was 
that it would perform better than the previously proposed RSPT. The new MRRT system 
would affect fewer mining companies (only iron ore and coal companies) as compared to 
those that would have been affected by RSPT and companies would also be taxed less 
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(Sarker and Whalan 2011). Studies that were carried out showed that the new MRRT would 
increase mining production, investment and employment (Kraal and Nash 2010).  However 
to the disappointment of government, the new introduced MRRT did not do this. The tax 
system did not raise the expected revenue and this was attributed to the complexity of the 
design and the drop in commodity prices.  The failure of this system has caused the 
government of Australia to repeal the tax, even though it was introduced after a royalties 
and RSPT were deemed not good enough systems for the government. This raises the 
question of which tax system Australia will be imposing next on its mining industry.  
 
2.5.2. Other Countries  
The Australian case is one that did not go well, however there are other countries that 
have employed the RRT in their resources industries. Countries such as Ghana have 
employed the RRT system in the resource industry (Addy 1998). Malawi imposes a 10 
percent RRT that is triggered when after tax cumulative cash flow exceeds 20 percent. 
Angola has changed the tax system to generate more revenue and meet policy objectives 
following the high oil prices, the country uses a PSC system which is profit based and 
progressive (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010). Governments of most of the resource rich countries 
have the objective of getting a fair share of the mineral wealth however the way in which 
the tax revenue is used is also important in determining the success of the overall tax 
system. Most resource endowed countries are subjected to the ‘resource curse’, this is 
when a country that is rich in mineral resources cannot sustain itself once the resources 
have depleted because it is resource dependent (Sarker and Whalan 2011).  
    
2.6. Current Tax Regimes in South Africa  
In 1998 a White paper specific to Minerals and Mining Policy was released, the paper dealt 
with most if not all issues pertaining to mining, including taxation. The policy had six main 
themes of which one of them was ‘Business Climate and Mineral Development’, under 
which was the discussion of mobility and changes in access to mineral rights (Africa 1998). 
Discussed further under that theme were issues of taxation and the objectives that a tax 
system should serve, with one of the mentioned requirement being the contribution of 
the mineral industry to tax revenue through royalties.  
This policy created a platform for development of The Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 (MPRDA) of 2002(Cawood and Minnitt 2001).  
The main aim for the MPRDA was to allow all people of South Africa the opportunity to 
benefit from the nation’s resources and to give ownership of the resources to the nation. 
With the complexity of state owned and privately owned mineral rights divisions and 
combinations in existence, there was a need for the MPRDA to have a simplified approach 
to mineral rights holding (Cawood and Minnitt 2001) and the act clearly states that the 
resources of the country belong to the South African citizens.  
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The act stipulates the payment of royalties to the government for the use of land by private 
parties. In 2008 the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty act (MPRRA) was 
promulgated and came into effect following its promulgation (Cawood and Oshokoya 
2013). Private sector dependent countries allow the investor to take a share of rent as a 
reward for taking on a risky investment, but also give a share to government through 
royalty and taxes (Cawood 2010). The ownership of mineral rights gives government the 
right to have a claim on mining revenue, and the South African government does this in 
three ways, through royalties, corporate income tax and finally through dividends tax. 
Cawood (2010) describes these as positions that government holds in the hierarchy of 
claims on mining revenue.  
 
2.6.1. Royalties  
The MPRRA had the objective of targeting mineral rents during commodity booms, and 
clearly states that royalties must be paid for exploitation of mineral resources to the 
National Revenue Fund. Royalties payable are calculated based on the classification of the 
mineral and the royalty act differentiates between a ‘refined’ mineral resource and an 
‘unrefined’ mineral resource and these are defined in Schedule 1 and 2 of the MPRRA. 
Different minerals have different conditions when refined and unrefined and the act 
provides these conditions in Schedule 1 and 2 respectively. The basic royalty calculation is 
the multiplication of the royalty rate by the royalty base (Africa 2002).  
Royalty Rate  
The royalty rate is calculated from the royalty formula, and has been designed to fluctuate 
with the profitability of the mine rather than being a fixed rate. The profitability of the mine 
is measured by the Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to sales ratio. The formula for the 
refined and unrefined rate are as follows (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013):  
REFINED: Y(r) = 0.5 + [EBIT/ (AGGREGATE GROSS SALES X 12.5)] X 100  
OR Yr% = 0.5 + (X/12.5)  
UNREFINED: Y (u) = 0.5 + [EBIT/ (AGGREGATE GROSS SALES X 9)] X 100  
OR Yu% = 0.5 + (X/9)  
These two formulae are based on the structure of Y% = (a + b) Where, a = the 
minimum factor of 0.5% for both refined and unrefined minerals.  
b = X/F  
X = the measure of profitability calculated as EBIT/AGGREGATE GROSS SALES  
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F = 12.5 for refined rate and 9 for unrefined rate. The maximum rate for 12.5 is 5% and the 
rate for 9 is 7%.  
The maximum rate is used during periods of commodity booms and the minimum scale is 
used during down times, this indicates that the government recognizes that there are good 
times in the industry and times when commodity prices are falling. The sliding scale nature 
of EBIT allows the formula to be adjustable for good and bad times. EBIT is defined as the 
gross sales after adding recoupments under the Income tax Act less the capital 
expenditure less the operating expenditure. Only earnings obtained for the purpose of 
mineral exploitation are considered in this calculation while negative EBIT is not 
considered (Cawood 2010).  
  
Royalty Base  
According to the act, the base of the act is the arm’s length gross sales value less the 
allowable deductions during the period of assessment, which is a year (12 months). The 
gross sales price increases if the minerals are sold below the refined condition, and if they 
are above the refined condition then the price is adjusted accordingly.  
Payment of royalties is regarded as a fair and competitive way of having investors give 
back to the state. Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) state that the royalty system is an efficient 
way of revenue collection for the government and should not be changed as the mining 
industry is already under a great enough tax burden, however they believe that South 
Africa has issues of revenue management that need to be sorted out in order to reap 
better rewards of the royalty system. With corruption on the rise, people have not been 
able to see the full wealth creation made by the new royalty system.  
 
2.6.2. Corporate Income Tax (CIT)  
The standard CIT rate in South Africa is 28 percent across all mining companies except the 
gold mining companies.  
The gold mining formula is used to calculate the tax levied from gold mines. The formula 
is of a sliding scale similar to that of royalty payments. The gold tax rate is calculated as 
follows (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013):  
Y = 43 – 215/X OR Y = a – ab/X  
Where,  
X = Taxable income/ Gold mining revenue, expressed as a percentage.  
a = marginal corporate tax rate which only applies to taxable income above the value of b.  
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b = 5% tax free tunnel, this is a 5% tax exemption on of the first 5% of profit.  
The gold mining formula is self-adjusting and allows government to tax the gold companies 
more when the gold price is high and low when the gold prices are low (Cawood and 
Oshokoya 2013). Mining and quarrying contributed 9.7 percent to the total tax assessed 
by South African Revenue Services (SARS) in 2015.The recent designs of CIT regimes can 
have an influence on an investor’s perception of how attractive investing in a country is, 
so South Africa should also keep its CIT system competitive in order to attract investors 
(Mullins 2010).  
 
2.6.3 Other Taxes  
Dividend tax (DT) is a tax that is charged on dividends that are declared by a company. The 
DT rate is currently at 15 percent and applies to shareholders who receive dividends 
distribution (SARS 2015).  
 
2.7. Conclusion   
Mineral taxation is important for the development of the economy in resource dependent 
countries. Designing a suitable tax system may pose many challenges and government 
needs to strike a balance between capturing sufficient rent to meet the needs of the state 
and keeping the investor happy enough to continue investing in the country.  
Although RRT has been one of the more favored tax systems because of the theories 
behind it, many have gone against the claims of efficiency that the system has been praised 
for. Despite the concept of RRT being in existence for so long countries such Australia 
haven’t reaped the rewards of using the tax system as much as they had hoped. South 
Africa however uses a royalties system which is considered to be efficient but needs to be 
managed better for people to reap the full rewards.  
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3. METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, the research methodology will be discussed, these are the methods that 
were used to achieve the project objectives. In section 3.2 the hypothetical case will be 
presented with model assumptions. Section 3.3 focuses on the research design, the model 
used and the model limitations before a conclusion is made in section 3.4.  
Having studied the background of the tax system used in South Africa and the history 
behind the need to propose a new tax system, it is now necessary to focus on achieving 
the objectives of this research. One major problem that researchers have faced when 
trying to quantify the change that is brought by a new tax system is access to data, this 
challenge leaves very few choices for one to use when evaluating a tax system empirically. 
South Africa is currently using a hybrid tax system as discussed in chapter 2 above, and 
therefore in this study a hybrid tax system will also be used, however the system will be 
designed according to the suggestions made on the ANC SIMS (2012) report. There are 
very few empirical studies that have been carried out on rent sharing and this could be 
largely attributed to the many limitations available in the resource industry. With more 
and countries having a sense that their governments are getting less than a fair share of 
the rent, an empirical study to show just how much government could get from a change 
of regime could prove to be helpful to many.   
 
3.2. Hypothetical Case Study  
The use of a hypothetical model to study the effects of change in tax system is popular 
because although companies have balance sheets available to the public, most mining 
companies have a number of operations around the world and their balance sheets show 
total tax paid which is calculated using various formulas from the different host countries 
where their operations are in. The best option then becomes creating a hypothetical case 
study with assumptions made that resemble those of an actual mine.  
 
3.2.1. Project Background  
MATHIS is platinum mine located in the eastern limb of the Bushveld complex in South 
Africa. The mining project was 100 percent equity financed by private investors. The 
investors are South African and therefore any other taxes from the home country are not 
considered for this study except the CIT and MRRT. The mining rights are owned by the 
state. The project is expected to start producing in 2015 with 63 thousand ounces 
produced in the first year of operation, and then ramping up to 95 thousand ounces a year 
until the project comes to an end. The life of the project is 10 years.  
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3.2.2. Model Assumptions  
The model assumptions were made with reference to the hypothetical iron ore project model created 
by Kraal and Nash (2010).  
• The project had an initial capital outlay of $80 million in 2014 and continued to inject 
capital of $3 million and $5 million into the project till the end of the project. All other 
expenses in 2014 and before that were not considered, these include costs incurred 
for obtaining exploration and mining permits since these where sunk costs.   
• Operating expenses were approximately 4 percent of the original capex in the first 
year and in the years following that were reduced to 3.7 percent of capex.  
• Annual Inflation was 6 percent (Inflation.eu 2016) and was compounded year on year 
using an inflation multiplier of 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 every 3 years (Kraal and Nash 2010).  
• The investors minimum required rate of return is 13.5 percent (KPMG 2012).  
 
3.3. Model Design  
 
The ANC SIMS report suggests that mining companies pay 28 percent CIT and a 50 percent 
MRRT rate on company profits with a threshold rate equal to the long term bond rate (8 
percent) plus 7 percent. The report however does not specify how mining allowances will 
be treated, therefore mining allowances were not taken into consideration in this model. 
For this study six cases were generated to yield different MRRT values. The six cases were 
generated by varying the threshold rate, MRRT rate and CIT rate from those suggested on 
the SIMS report. The threshold rate cannot be lower than the minimum required rate of 
return of an investor and was thus increased from this minimum rate in the case scenarios. 
Keeping the threshold rate is a possibility that was not explored in this study. Each case 
scenario therefore has a different tax model.  
 
The case scenarios are tabulated below and are divided into two categories, A and B, where 
category A contains the case scenarios with the same CIT rate of 28 percent and category 
B contains the case scenarios with a CIT of 25 percent.  The case scenarios were arranged 
such that the odd numbered cases are in category A while the even numbered cases are 
in category B.  
The six generated cash flows are shown in the appendix, with the net cash flows 
compounded at the threshold rate. MRRT was calculated using the formula used by Kraal 
and Nash (2010) in valuating an iron ore project in Australia.  
 MRRT = MRRT RATE x (PROFIT-ALLOWANCES)  
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Table 4 : Category A and Category B case scenarios 
CATEGORY A   
 Threshold Rate (%) Tax rate (%) Corporate Income Tax 
(%) 
CASE 1 17 30 28 
CASE 3 15 50 28 
CASE 5 13.5 60 28 
 
CATEGORY B 
 Threshold Rate (%) Tax Rate (%) Corporate Income Tax 
(%) 
CASE 2 17 30 25 
CASE 4 15 50 25 
CASE 6 13.5 60 25 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
Although hypothetical cases are not the first choice when conducting research, in most 
cases that involve tax, a hypothetical case becomes the easier way to find out the impacts 
that tax would have on companies. Lack of data and data sources leaves hypothetical cases 
as an available option to carry out research. With very little research available on impact 
of tax on projects and mining companies in South Africa and with the SIMS report not 
having covered some aspects of the MRRT model, many assumptions have to be made 
however this opens up opportunity to study different scenarios to determine which would 
be suitable for South Africa.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
4.1. Introduction  
In chapter 4, the results obtained from the model described in chapter 3 are presented. In 
section 4.2 the findings will be presented and discussed. Section 4.3 will have discussions 
about the necessity of changing a tax regime in South Africa and what implications this has 
on the investor – government relationship. Section 4.4 will conclude the chapter.  
 
4.2. Presentation of Results 
In each of the cases as presented in chapter 3, the MRRT and NPV of the project were 
obtained to further value the project. Figure 2 below shows the results of the MRRT revenue 
that government stands to make in each case scenario.   
Figure 2: MRRT revenue generated under each case scenario 
 
Findings show that case scenario 6 makes the most revenue for government. Case 6 has 
the lowest threshold rate which means the point at which MRRT is triggered is achieved 
much earlier in profit making, allowing the government to tax more rent from the 
company. This case also has the highest tax rate at 60 %, allowing government to again tax 
the company more compared to other cases. The general findings are however that the 
revenue seems to increase from case 1 indicating that the revenue will be most influenced 
by the combination of the MRRT tax rate and the threshold rate. Case 1 has the worst tax 
model for government if the purpose of tax is revenue generation, because not only is the 
company taxed less, the threshold rate is also the highest.  
Case 5 which is the suggested model according to the SIMS report is almost the highest 
revenue generating model, and is thus a good fit for government should their biggest 
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objective be revenue generation over and above other objectives. The effects of varying 
the CIT are shown on figure 2.2 below.  
CATEGORY A and B FINDINGS  
Figure 2.2.1 below shows the comparison of the two categories. The difference between 
the two categories is only 4 percent across all the MRRT revenues for the six case scenarios, 
whether or not this difference is enough for government to reduce CIT for mining 
companies is a topic that still needs further research. An interesting observation made was 
that under that overall MRRT revenue collected under cases of category B was higher than 
revenue collected under category A. This observation can be attributed to the fact that a 
reduced CIT rate increases the net income subject to MRRT which therefore means that 
government has a bigger amount to tax from. Case 6 therefore has the most optimal tax 
rates for government.  
Figure 3: Comparison of MRRT revenue collected under category A and category B 
  
  
NET PRESENT VALUE  
The major findings for the NPV were that the highest NPV for the project is with case 2 as can 
be seen in figure 4 below.  Case 2 has the highest NPV while the rather obvious finding is that 
the suggested case 5 according to the government generates one of the least NPV. The results 
show that the combination of the tax rates in case 5 produces the least NPV for the company 
because they stand to lose more on corporate income tax and with the lowest threshold rate, 
more money is being subject to MRRT, leaving less profit for the company.  
Increasing the MRRT rate whilst decreasing the threshold rate has a downward effect on profit 
making for companies. The effect of reducing the CIT can be observed here again where the 
cases with the higher company tax seem to be the lowest NPV generators in the pack.  
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Figure 4: NPV generated from each case scaenario 
  
 
Furthermore the effect of varying the threshold rate while keeping the tax rate and CIT rate 
fixed was studied, this was to observe the difference that a threshold rate can make in 
revenue collection for government, and similarly the effect of varying tax rate with other rates 
fixed was done. The CIT rate was kept fixed for both studies at 28 percent. The results of both 
these studies are shown on figure 3 below. The first three columns on the graph have the 
same threshold rate while the last three columns have the same tax rates, the combination 
of rates is shown on the table below. 
 
Table 5: Combination of threshold rate and MRRT rate 
 Threshold rate (%) MRRT rate (%) 
A 15 30 
B 15 60 
C 15 50 
D 17 50 
E 13.5 50 
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Figure 5: MRRT revenue collected by keeping either the threshold rate fixed or MRRT rate. 
 
 
The most evident observation from figure 5 above is the difference between revenue 
generated in the two cases A and B that have the same threshold rate but different MRRT 
rates, the difference in revenue is 50 percent while the difference between D and E with 
the same MRRT rate is 12 percent. This shows that the biggest contributor to revenue 
generation is the MRRT tax rate. Varying the threshold rate does make a difference 
however it is almost negligible compared to the difference made by increasing the MRRT 
rate. This means that government needs to focus more on what an optimal MRRT rate 
would be but keeping in mind that the rate must not cause investors to re-evaluate their 
business interests in the country. Figure 5 below shows the corresponding NPVs and from 
the graph only the combination of a threshold rate of 15 percent and MRRT rate of 30 
percent gives a positive NPV. 
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Figure 6: NPV generated by varying either the MRRT rate of the threshold rate 
 
 
From the above findings, government needs to consider changing the proposed model of 
having a threshold rate of 15 percent and MRRT rate of 50 percent to reducing the tax rate 
to a rate between 50 percent and 30 percent.  If government wants to encourage investors 
to continue exploration in the country then there needs to be a balance between the profit 
that companies make and the revenue that government can collect. Government should 
not be too lenient by using a case 2 scenario tax model because they will not be making a 
fair enough share, however a case 5 kind of scenario with a tax rate that is too high can 
cost the country loss of investment. Mining companies need to propose a negotiation 
before the government implements the MRRT model as proposed on the SIMS report 
because any tax rate higher than 50 percent will make companies operate at losses and 
may cause existing marginal mines to close.  
 
 
4.3. Discussion  
The objective of government when setting up fiscal policies for tax isn’t just revenue 
collection, but an overall efficient system is preferred. There is therefore great importance 
in assessing the MRRT system against the current system of royalties to find out if indeed 
the MRRT is the best choice to use in South Africa. MRRT has a high revenue raising 
potential (Land 2008) however the current system employed in South Africa is considered 
to be a very efficient and competitive (Donelly 2012).  Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) 
carried out a study to evaluate the current tax system used in South Africa and found that 
the introduction of the royalties act actually led to an increase in mining taxes and 
therefore increased government revenue, which led them to the conclude that introducing 
an MRRT system was unnecessary.  
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An efficient tax system focuses on more than just revenue collection, and that is why it is 
important to have a discussion not only based on the revenue collecting ability of the MRRT 
but on other factors that will show whether South Africa is ready for a change in tax system 
to the MRRT system. Although there has been conflicting views about the neutrality of the 
MRRT system, governments are moving away from the focus on neutrality and basing 
decisions of tax reform on other issues that are in line with their objectives (Laporte and de 
Quatrebarbes 2015). 
What has not been discussed in this study is the investor’s response to a change in tax 
system .Governments can have incentives in place for mining companies during the early 
processes of mining (Laporte and de Quatrebarbes 2015), however once production has 
begun, government can change tax systems which maybe a shock to investors, this is 
known as a ‘tax culture shock’ (Sarker and Whalan 2011).  
The response of an investor to change in tax system can be varied, and can in some cases 
lead to the investor choosing to take his investment elsewhere (Land 2008). 
 As discussed in chapter 2 the investor’s perception of risk is influenced by a country’s 
political risk and uncertainty about the stability of the tax system. For future investors a 
change in tax system will decrease the stability of the tax system in place at the moment 
of investment and thus either increase the investor’s rate of return (Garnaut 2010) or 
cause a decrease in investment flow (Land 2008).    
Land (2008) highlights that one of the problems that governments face when designing a 
tax system is fiscal risk. The design of the MRRT system allows for tax payment only when 
there are super profits made however with commodity prices slumping (Mining 
Weekly,2015), there is an increased risk that government will not collect as much revenue 
as is anticipated should a decision be made to change tax systems. MRRT would increase 
the uncertainty of government revenue since it is already known to be a very volatile 
system (Robson 2012).  
 An increase in taxation can cause problems of tax avoidance or evasion (Boadway and 
Flatters 1993), this problem is related to the administrative capabilities of government and 
their monitoring system (Sunley and Baunsgaard 2001). South Africa has already been 
found to be one of the countries facing administration challenges with the current royalties 
act (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013). RRT is already considered a complicated tax system that 
has high chances of presenting administrative challenges more especially to countries with 
poor administrative capabilities (Daniel, Keen et al. 2010). A reduction in the number of 
taxes has been identified as one of the things that could reduce the administrative burden 
on the government (Calder 2010), the South African government needs to revisit the 
proposal to impose more than one tax system on the mining industry as proposed on the 
SIMS report.   
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One other important deciding factor should be the difficulty associated with designing and 
implementing a tax system such as MRRT. Firstly there is the complexity in measuring and 
taxing rents(Boadway and Flatters 1993), secondly deciding on tax threshold and lastly 
setting the tax rate and the implementation of the two rates,these seem to pose 
difficulties when designing an MRRT system(Sunley and Baunsgaard 2001).  
Although MRRT is what the South African government has proposed as the next step to 
take in tax reform, Boadway and Keen (2010) highlight that there are other non- distorting 
tax systems that have a good potential of raising revenue besides MRRT.  
 
4.4. Conclusion  
The financial impact of MRRT on companies will be highly distorted for the worst if the 
government decided to use a case 6 scenario. Government stand to collect high revenues 
however government is faced with plenty of challenges if they decide to change the tax 
system from the current royalty system to the MRRT purely for the benefit of high revenue 
collection. By varying the tax rate governments can design a better suited model that is 
fair to the investor but still meets the efficiency criteria of a tax system.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1. Introduction  
The previous 4 chapters presented the introduction, literature review, methodology and 
presentation of results, in this chapter the focus will be on combining everything together 
and making final conclusions based on findings made especially in chapter 4. In section 5.2 
there will be a discussion about the findings, then an overall conclusion will be made in 
section 5.3 followed by recommendations about the research topic and for future research 
in the last section of the study, section 5.4.  
 
5.2. Discussion  
Very little research has been conducted around South Africa’s tax system and other 
countries in Africa, most of the empirical studies done on taxation in developing countries 
has been through hypothetical case scenarios (Laporte and de Quatrebarbes 2015) and 
this can be attributed to the difficulty in measuring rents in existing project and in some 
cases obtaining economic data and firm data (Boadway and Flatters 1993).  
Using a hypothetical mining project to find a suitable mining tax model for this study was 
limiting as most design features were not factored into the model, due to difficulties 
presented when dealing with a country’s mining tax system as a whole(Laporte and de 
Quatrebarbes 2015).   A common way of determining the threshold rate of return was used 
as suggested on the SIMS report, and for calculating the NPV an approach adapted from a 
project evaluation done by Kraal and Nash (2010) was used.  
The major findings of this study revealed that the project NPV will be negatively affected 
should the government decide on a 15 percent threshold rate, 50 percent MRRT rate and 
a 28 percent CIT rate. On the side of the government however, the highest revenue will be 
collected if the government uses the 60 percent tax rate but reduces the CIT rate to 25 
percent. Keeping in mind that rents cannot be completely taxed (Boadway and Keen 2010), 
varying the MRRT rate was found to produce the biggest difference between revenue 
collected as opposed to varying the threshold rate and the CIT. Although there have been 
a lot of studies that support the findings that MRRT has a greater potential than other tax 
systems in collection of revenue (Land 2008), revenue cannot be the only deciding factor 
especially for a developing country like South Africa that faces other challenges with tax 
policies(Cawood and Oshokoya 2013) and like other countries, needs to strike a balance 
between being fair to the investor but also receiving a fair share of the mineral 
wealth(Daniel, Keen et al. 2010).  
South Africa has been facing challenges with the current royalty system used and may face 
difficulties if there is a change in tax system (Cawood and Oshokoya 2013).  
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Although empirically only one approach was studied (NPV and revenue collection), the 
theoretical study shows that South Africa might not be ready to change the tax system to 
something as complex as a MRRT.   
 
5.3. Conclusion  
This study was conducted to evaluate the RRT model that was suggested on the SIMS 
(2012) report and therefore assess the financial implications of implementing RRT in South 
Africa. Using a hypothetical project case the effects of different combinations of MRRT 
threshold rates, tax rates and CIT rates were carefully studied, and an optimum model was 
suggested based on the findings of the case study.   
South Africa is a resource endowed country and the tax system that it applies should be 
able to meet the objectives of the MPRDA of 2012 that was developed to show state 
ownership of mineral rights. Although RRT has been in existence for a long time the 
theories made by Garnaut and Clunies (1975) have come under scrutiny and authors have 
proved that RRT is not what it is believed to be. Countries such as Australia have put the 
RRT tax system to the test in both the mining and petroleum industry and have had varied 
results, one being good and the other being bad.  
Even though the study was conducted using a hypothetical project case, the study showed 
that the effect of changing from the current royalty system will be a disadvantage to both 
the investor and government, despite the fact that government can collect high revenue.  
 
5.4. Recommendations  
The major recommendation based on the findings of the study is that South Africa should 
hold off on implementing the MRRT system and rather continue to do research on how 
best the RRT can be implemented in South Africa. There is also a recommendation that 
government should hold negotiations with the mining industry to establish the best tax 
model that can be satisfactory to both parties.  Things that need attention and further 
research are:  
• Research on the overall mining tax system for South Africa.  
• Implementing an RRT in the mining industry as a pure tax without using a hybrid model.  
• Overall comparison of the current royalties system and the MRRT system.  
Once extensive research has been done on the above mentioned recommendations, South 
Africa can then make a more informed decision about changing from the current royalty 
system to the suggested MRRT system. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
 
Discounted Cash Flow:Case 1
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -136388000 -9.2E+07 -9.3E+07 -9.8E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -70202846 13870960 18660430 19819450 20732770 21646090 22881220 23870650 24860080 26171320 27236860
company Tax -19656796.88 3883869 5224920 5549446 5805176 6060905 6406742 6683782 6960822 7327970 7626321
Net Income subject to MRRT -50546049.12 9987091 13435510 14270004 14927594 15585185 16474478 17186868 17899258 18843350 19610539
MRRT payment -15163814.74 2996127 4030653 4281001 4478278 4675555 4942344 5156060 5369777 5653005 5883162
Net Profit After Tax -35382234.38 6990964 9404857 9989003 10449316 10909629 11532135 12030808 12529480 13190345 13727377
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV $107,651.94
Total MRRT 32,302,148.54$  
Discounted Cash Flow:Case 2
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -136388000 -9.2E+07 -9.3E+07 -9.8E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -70202846 13870960 18660430 19819450 20732770 21646090 22881220 23870650 24860080 26171320 27236860
company Tax -17550711.5 3467740 4665108 4954863 5183193 5411523 5720305 5967663 6215020 6542830 6809215
Net Income subject to MRRT -52652134.5 10403220 13995323 14864588 15549578 16234568 17160915 17902988 18645060 19628490 20427645
MRRT payment -15795640.35 3120966 4198597 4459376 4664873 4870370 5148275 5370896 5593518 5888547 6128294
Net Profit After Tax -36856494.15 7282254 9796726 10405211 10884704 11364197 12012641 12532091 13051542 13739943 14299352
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV $841,474.71
Total MRRT 33,648,071.40$  
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Discounted Cash Flow:Case 3
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -134788000 -9.1E+07 -9.2E+07 -9.7E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -68602846 14726720 19494830 20700050 21663770 22627490 23913020 24957050 26001080 27366920 28491260
company Tax -19208796.88 4123482 5458552 5796014 6065856 6335697 6695646 6987974 7280302 7662738 7977553
Net Income subject to MRRT -49394049.12 10603238 14036278 14904036 15597914 16291793 17217374 17969076 18720778 19704182 20513707
MRRT payment -24697024.56 5301619 7018139 7452018 7798957 8145896 8608687 8984538 9360389 9852091 10256854
Net Profit After Tax -24697024.56 5301619 7018139 7452018 7798957 8145896 8608687 8984538 9360389 9852091 10256854
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV ($2,777,999.12)
Total MRRT 58,082,163.84$  
Discounted Cash Flow:Case 4
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -134788000 -9.1E+07 -9.2E+07 -9.7E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -68602846 14726720 19494830 20700050 21663770 22627490 23913020 24957050 26001080 27366920 28491260
company Tax -17150711.5 3681680 4873708 5175013 5415943 5656873 5978255 6239263 6500270 6841730 7122815
Net Income subject to MRRT -51452134.5 11045040 14621123 15525038 16247828 16970618 17934765 18717788 19500810 20525190 21368445
MRRT payment -25726067.25 5522520 7310561 7762519 8123914 8485309 8967383 9358894 9750405 10262595 10684223
Net Profit After Tax -25726067.25 5522520 7310561 7762519 8123914 8485309 8967383 9358894 9750405 10262595 10684223
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV ($2,164,411.81)
Total MRRT 60,502,254.00$  
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Discounted Cash Flow:Case 5
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -133588000 -9E+07 -9.1E+07 -9.7E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -67402846 15368540 20120630 21360500 22362020 23363540 24686870 25771850 26856830 28263620 29432060
company Tax -18872796.88 4303191 5633776 5980940 6261366 6541791 6912324 7216118 7519912 7913814 8240977
Net Income subject to MRRT -48530049.12 11065349 14486854 15379560 16100654 16821749 17774546 18555732 19336918 20349806 21191083
MRRT payment -29118029.47 6639209 8692112 9227736 9660393 10093049 10664728 11133439 11602151 12209884 12714650
Net Profit After Tax -19412019.65 4426140 5794741 6151824 6440262 6728700 7109819 7422293 7734767 8139923 8476433
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV ($4,435,452.30)
Total MRRT 73,519,321.25$  
Discounted Cash Flow:Case 6
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE($)
Original Capex -8E+07
Ongoing capex -3000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000 -5000000
Escalated -3378000 -5960000 -6290000 -6650000 -7010000 -7370000 -7760000 -8150000 -8540000 -8960000 -9380000
Exploration 0
Ounces 63000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000 95000
Escalated $/oz 1050.558 1112.136 1173.714 1240.89 1308.066 1375.242 1448.016 1520.79 1593.564 1671.936 1750.308
Revenue($) 66185154 1.06E+08 1.12E+08 1.18E+08 1.24E+08 1.31E+08 1.38E+08 1.44E+08 1.51E+08 1.59E+08 1.66E+08
Operating Expenses -35000000 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07 -3E+07
Escalated opex($ ) -39410000 -3.6E+07 -3.8E+07 -4E+07 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.1E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.6E+07
Total costs -8E+07 -42788000 -4.2E+07 -4.4E+07 -4.7E+07 -4.9E+07 -5.2E+07 -5.4E+07 -5.7E+07 -6E+07 -6.3E+07 -6.6E+07
write off of new capex -133588000 -9E+07 -9.1E+07 -9.7E+07 -1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.1E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.2E+08 -1.3E+08 -1.4E+08
Profit before MRRT -67402846 15368540 20120630 21360500 22362020 23363540 24686870 25771850 26856830 28263620 29432060
company Tax -16850711.5 3842135 5030158 5340125 5590505 5840885 6171718 6442963 6714208 7065905 7358015
Net Income subject to MRRT -50552134.5 11526405 15090473 16020375 16771515 17522655 18515153 19328888 20142623 21197715 22074045
MRRT payment -30331280.7 6915843 9054284 9612225 10062909 10513593 11109092 11597333 12085574 12718629 13244427
Net Profit After Tax -20220853.8 4610562 6036189 6408150 6708606 7009062 7406061 7731555 8057049 8479086 8829618
Annual Inflation 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Inflation Multiplier 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Compound Inflation 12.60% 19.20% 25.80% 33% 40.20% 47.40% 55.20% 63% 70.80% 79.20% 87.60%
NPV ($3,890,925.54)
Total MRRT 76,582,626.30$  
